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I explore the effects of a preference for fairness in the division of housework between two
spouses in two different models of household time allocation. Both in the model with agreeing
spouses and the model with noncooperative spouses, such a preference has an equalising
effect on the division of labour between the partners. In the noncooperative setting, the wife
gets better off and the husband worse off in terms of private consumption. I also argue that
both the allocation process and the degree of fairness consideration matter for policy outcomes
and discuss three policy measures in relation to these two factors.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to integrate two important and distinct literatures: that of
household allocation and that of fairness considerations. In two simple models of household
time allocation, I introduce a wife’s preference for fairness over the division of housework.
The term ”fairness” is used to indicate a subjective judgement/preference over the division of
housework. It is modelled so that the utility of a person who has such a preference for fairness
cares about the shares of housework performed by themselves and their spouse. It is shown
that a fairness preference alter couples’ time allocation and has implications also for
consumption patterns. I will argue that if such a preference for fairness is prominent in
household behaviour, policy implications based solely on comparative advantages may be
misleading, or wrong altogether.
Mainstream economic models of the household have emphasised the role of
comparative advantages in the determination of the division of work. For a prominent
example see Gary S. Becker (1981). In these models, the wage differential and the spouses’
productivities in housework determine who does the paid work and who does the housework.
Such economic aspects are no doubt parameters in couples’ decision about the division of
work, but they may also be counteracted by other, non-economic preferences, like for instance
a preference for ”fairness” over the division of housework.
Although it is probably part of human nature to value one’s own position
relative to others’, very few economic theories feature agents whose well-being depend on
relative as well as absolute resources. A well-known exception is the ”non-economic”
efficiency wage models of George A. Akerlof (1982), Robert Solow (1983), and Akerlof and
Janet L. Yellen (1990), in which workers have a preference for a wage rate on par with that of
a comparison group. In personnel management texts, such a preference for a ”fair wage” is2
even considered self-evident
1, and experimental evidence also indicate that workers care about
what other workers receive (Akerlof and Yellen p. 258). Furthermore, Andrew E. Clark and
Andrew J. Oswald (1996) present interview results to the effect that workers whose wages are
on par with a comparison wage are much more satisfied with their job.
But it is not only in the labour market that people may compare themselves to
others. Also in the private sphere inter-personal comparisons are common.
2 Research in
sociology of intra-household interaction gives evidence that especially the division of unpaid
housework affect spouses’ well-being. Specifically, wives’ perception of fairness of the
household division of housework seems to be vital for their marital satisfaction, see e.g. Joyce
Robinson and Glenna Spitze (1992), Sampson Lee Blair and Michael P. Johnson (1992),
Linda Thompson (1991), and Mary Holland Benin and Joan Agostinelli (1988). These studies
confirm that married and/or cohabiting women feel less satisfied the less their partner’s share
of the housework, often even regardless of the division of paid work within the household. It
is reasonable to assume that these psychological mechanisms have an impact on households’
division of labour.
In this paper I explore the effects of the presence of a fairness preference in two
mainstream economic models of household allocation. The first one is a version of the model
of Paul A. Samuelson’s (1956), in which the two spouses agree on a household welfare
function to maximise. Because the relevance of such a unitary model has been empirically
challenged, I also explore the introduction of a fairness preference in a noncooperative
household model. In this model, the spouses fail to agree on a common welfare function.
Apart from a private consumption good, the models include a household public good,
produced with the spouses’ household labour. The wife is assumed to have a lower wage and
                                                
1 Akerlof and Yellen (1990), p. 263.
2  People with brothers or sisters probably agree that fairness in the division between siblings is vital!3
a preference for equality in the division of housework. Therefore, in my models, two forces
are at work in determining the spouses respective contribution to each kind of work:
comparative advantages and a wife’s preference for a more equal division of housework. This
set-up recognises the economic and social content of market and household labour, argued by
Elisabeth Bergen (1991) and others.
With a fairness preference, the household allocations of work and consumption
that emerge are different from the ones that would be obtained should the models feature
economic incentives only. The more important the fairness issue is, the more equal is the
division of market and housework in both models. A strong preference for fairness also
implies less household public good in both models. However, whereas the two partners
always have identical consumption bundles in the first best model, a wives’ fairness
consideration makes noncooperative husbands worse off because they get less private
consumption. Wives, on the other hand, get more private consumption. In the Samuelsonian,
first best, model, a wife’s preference for fairness is synonymous with the couple’s preference
for fairness. Therefore, the relative importance of the fairness preference can be used to
capture different households’ different degrees of gender equality orientation. That there are
different types of households in this respect will prove important for policy analysis. Because
policies often rely on economic incentives, I argue that fairness oriented agreeing couples
react differently than other couples to certain policy measures.
I am aware that the two household models I use may well be overly simple, but
they serve the useful purpose of illumination the importance of the fairness preference in the
clearest possible way. However, in future work, I plan to make use of more elaborate models
incorporating endogenous leisure, explicit bargaining and/or market substitutes for the
household good.4
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews theory
and evidence on household allocation and evidence on people’s preferences for fairness. In
section 3, I present the first best household allocation model with agreeing spouses. The
model in section 4 is a Cournot-Nash noncooperative model where the spouses do not agree
on a common objective function. Section 5 summarises and concludes the paper.
2 The household division of labour
2.1 Economic theory
Economists’ view of the family as an institution has varied over time. The classical
economists considered the household as an institution (that should be) guided solely by non-
economic forces such as morality and altruism (Jean Gardiner, 1997). Also many of the early
neoclassical economists shared this view and therefore argued forcefully for legislation
against women’s employment in their days (Michèle Pujol, 1995). A notable exception was
John Stuart Mill who wrote on the household division of labour:
[E]ven when no more is earned by the labour of a man and a
woman than would have been earned by the man alone, the
advantage to the woman of not depending on a master for
subsistence may be more than equivalent.
3
His statement stands in sharp contrast not only to the views of his contemporaries, but also to
the analysis of the new neoclassical family theory. Becker (1981) was among the first
economists to theorise about the division of labour within households as guided by foremost
economic forces, like the gains from specialisation. According to this theory, a married couple
allocate the wife’s and husband’s time analogously to the famous butter and gun example in
trade theory. By specialisation of tasks, the couple benefit from the fact that they are
                                                
3 John Stuart Mill (1865), quoted in Gardiner (1997).5
differently endowed and can trade with each other in different kinds of work. According to
Becker, biology and gender-specific investment in human capital make the wife best suited for
housework, and the husband for working for pay in the labour market. Total welfare from this
arrangement will be greater than if the two spouses share the breadwinner role as well as the
housework. This is because people who do both cooking and labour force participation cannot
fully invest in the skills they are relatively better at. In other words, the potential gain from
marriage is determined by the spouses’ wage-ratio and their productivities in housework.
Other models of household division of labour along these lines can be found in e.g. Yoram
Weiss (1993), Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman (1988), and Amyra
Grossbard-Shechtman (1984).
As far as the intra-household distribution of consumption is concerned, the
neoclassical marriage model treats the family as a single consumer. This can be achieved in
two ways. Either the spouse who specialises in market work (who controls the money),
dictates what the household’s utility function looks like (this is the approach used by Becker)
4,
or the family maximises a common utility function (Samuelson, 1956) under a joint budget
constraint. Under both constructions, a household’s consumption pattern looks like that of a
single person. These two models are therefore often referred to as the unitary model. No
doubt, a common household utility function would be a useful simplification, but its validity
has been rejected in several empirical studies, see e.g. Matz Dahlberg (1997), Martin
Browning and Pierre-André Chiappori (1996), Shelley A. Phipps and Peter S. Burton (1995)
and Martin Browning et al. (1994). But just because the unitary model has been rejected at an
aggregate level, it does not preclude the possibility that some households behave in
                                                
4 The famous Rotten Kid Theorem makes selfish wives (and kids) behave according to the altruistic husband’s
preferences out of sheer self-interest.6
accordance with it. It is therefore justified to explore models of agreeing couples along with
other models.
Another strand of the economics literature on the household are the bargaining
models. This approach assumes that the spouses have different views about what is best for
the household. Marjorie B. McElroy and Mary J. Horney (1981) develop a Nash bargaining
model, where the couple bargain over the allocation of consumption, leisure and a household
public good. The spouses’ fall back positions are their respective positions as single, i.e. a
divorce scenario. A person’s well-being in the case of a divorce depend on wages, non-labour
income and ”extrahousehold environmental parameters” (such as welfare policies, remarriage
market opportunities etc.); therefore all these appear directly in all demand and supply
functions.
More recent bargaining models use noncooperative behaviour within the
marriage as a more plausible fall back position than a divorce. In the separate spheres
bargaining model of Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1993), this entails automatic
gender specific responsibilities. In other words, should the spouses fail to agree on the
distribution, the woman takes on all the housework and her husband does only market work.
There are still gains from joint consumption of the household public goods, but these are
typically underprovided. Kaj Konrad and Kjell-Erik Lommerud (1995) explore the effects of
alternative family policies in a somewhat different (and more realistic) noncooperative
marriage model. Unlike Lundberg and Pollak, they model the noncooperative equilibrium as
one where each partner works on the labour market and supplies some positive amount of
household labour.
5
                                                
5 A fourth school of marriage models are the so called ”attitudinal models” (the term is used by Phipps and
Burton, 1995). These models feature cooperative bargaining spouses with unequal power. The relative weights
attached to the husband’s and the wife’s preferences could be thought of as reflections of societal norms that may
differ over countries or different population strata.7
A general feature of all cooperative bargaining models is that the strengthening
of a spouse’s fall back position improves her/his share of the gains from marriage. In all
models where the couple somehow manage to reach an agreement, a Pareto optimal allocation
is achieved, whereas under noncooperative behaviour, there is always a problem of
underprovision of household public goods. What distinguishes the Pareto efficient bargaining
models from the models of Becker and Samuelson is that the distribution is set according to
bargaining power rather than a common utility function.
2.2 Evidence of a fairness consideration and the division of housework
To an economists’ discussion list, on the topic whether ”wage equals marginal product”, the
following contribution was made:
I have always been bitterly amused when academic
economists argue fiercely with department heads, deans, and
others for higher salaries. In my experience there is nary a
mention of increased marginal products, but lots of mention
of the salaries of other people and etc. Apparently the
equation [wage = marginal product] does not work very well
in the area we know best.
6
Although the quotation suggests that also economists compare their reward to what others’
receive, the phenomenon is rarely acknowledged in models of economic agents’ behaviour.
Two exceptions are Richard Layard (1980) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Layard discusses
some implications from the assumption that all people care about their social ranking or
”status”. Akerlof and Yellen apply a similar idea to the labour market and present a model
where workers put in a maximal work effort only if they are paid a ”fair wage”. Akerlof and
Yellen assume that workers notion of a fair wage is based on what co-workers and others
earn. Their (main) equilibrium features wage compression due to the fairness preference and
conforms to many other stylised facts of unemployment. Clark and Oswald (1996) present8
empirical support for this fair wage hypothesis in their quantitative examination of job
satisfaction among British workers. They find an inverse relationship between workers’ level
of job satisfaction and a proxy for the fairness norm, a comparison wage. Also, interview
surveys indicate that wage setting managers believe employees to care about fairness to a
considerable extent, see e.g. Truman Bewley (1995) and Jonas Agell and Per Lundborg
(1995). For more elaboration of the importance of fairness for the workings of the labour
market, see Solow (1990).
A couple of other examples can be found in the taxation literature. Michael J.
Boskin and Eytan Sheshinski (1978) and Mats Persson (1995) present models where people’s
preference for relative wages or consumption levels yields a negative externality so that
everybody works too much. An income tax can then successfully be employed to reduce the
excess labour supply of the individual worker. Agell and Lundborg (1992) present a model
where workers are assumed to care about the wage-rental ratio. Also in this study, the classical
results on tax incidence change with the introduction of a fairness consideration. Thus, in
situations when fairness matters, many policy implications of the mainstream approach may
be inadequate. A similar argument can be applied to household behaviour: if people are
concerned with fairness within the household, policy implications may not be the same as in
the mainstream utility specification.
Throughout the 20th century, the female labour force participation and women’s
earnings in Western countries has been rising steadily, both in absolute levels and relative to
men.
7 Women’s rising incomes not only render the household more income, but also make the
                                                                                                                                                        
6 Anne Mayhew, femecon-l July 30, 1997.
7 Barbara R. Bergmann (1986, chapter 2) distinguishes three causes for the rise in female labour force
participation. First, the trend of technological change has raised women’s real market wages, implying a rising
alternative cost of housework. Second, as more women choose market work, individual and societal attitudes
regarding gender roles change. Third, falling fertility rates substantially reduce the need for time-intensive
housework. The three explanations may also interact and reinforce each other.9
wife gain more financial autonomy. There is evidence indicating that the more income a
spouse contributes towards the family budget, the larger is her/his role in household decision
making. An early example is Jan Pahl’s (1989) study of intra-household resource distribution,
where she finds that most women who are prominent in household decision making are
engaged in paid work. Recognising this fact, exploring the effects of a female preference for a
more equal distribution of paid and unpaid work seems well motivated.
Not surprisingly, such a preference on women’s behalf has been detected in
many sociological studies of married and cohabiting couples. Benin and Agostinelli (1988)
report that among the 74 dual-earner couples they interviewed both men and women found a
50-50 split of the housework ideal. On average, however, men’s self-reported amount of
housework was far less than that of the women and, consequently, the women were less
satisfied with the household division of housework. It also turned out that men in this study
cared about the number of hours whereas the women cared for their husband’s partaking in
traditionally female housework. This result is confirmed by Robinson and Spitze (1992) who
interviewed 600 women and men, and found that women are dissatisfied with the relative
division of housework, not the total amount, and therefore report less marital happiness than
men. Blair and Johnson (1992), find similar results. However, their 1000 married women
sample also include full-time homemakers and it is surprising that also these wives’
perception of fairness is strongly correlated with their husbands’ contribution to traditionally
female housework.
8
The formation of a person’s perception of fairness may be a rather complex
process. In this paper, the word fairness, like in the fair wage literature, conforms to theories
                                                
8 Women’s lower level of satisfaction has tangible implications. Ronald C. Kessler and James A. McRae (1982)
and Catherine E. Ross, John Mirowsky and Joan Huber (1983) are concerned with spouses’ mental health in
relation to the division of housework. Both report that women whose husbands share the housework have a better
mental heath status than other married women.10
of distributive justice. In other words, the term is used to indicate what people mean when
they say things like: it is not fair that I should do all the laundry when I am working full-time!
I do not use it in the technical sense as to mean ”absence of envy” (which is a common
definition in economics) or that a person is willing to give up material well-being in order to
punish unfair behaviour (as for example in Matthew Rabin, 1993).
How do real-life households allocate their members’ time to market and
housework? A stylised fact of the present seems to be that men and women work about the
same amount totally in most Western countries.
9 Interestingly however, the distribution on
paid and unpaid work depends very much on which country we study. Country specific factors
that are believed to affect this distribution are: societal/religious attitudes to gender roles,
labour market characteristics and public policy. Hettie Pott-Buter and Wouter Buitenhuis
(1998) argue that these factors interact and that it has resulted in very low female labour force
participation, especially among married women, in the Netherlands. Consequently, Dutch
women on average work little in the labour market and do much more unpaid housework: just
over 80% of all housework is performed by women in the Netherlands, see Tanja van der
Lippe and Jacques J. Siegers (1994). In the Scandinavian countries women do about two
thirds of all housework (Lennart Flood and Urban Gråsjö, 1995, Peter R￿rmose Jensen
(1995), Julie Aslaksen and Charlotte Koren, 1995).
Aggregate averages like these may be deceptive, though. The fact that on
average men and women work the same amount of time may hide an underlying pattern of
systematic overload on employed women. Bergmann (1986), classifies a 290-couple sample,
interviewed in 1975-76, into five kinds of household arrangements. These are: housewife
(44%), semi-housewife (the wife held a part-time job and remained with the full responsibility
for the housework, 20%), drudge-wife (fully employed wife with most responsibility for11
housework, 13%), two-housekeepers (both spouses were employed and shared the housework
more or less equally, 6%) and cash-paying couples (where household related services were
bought from others, 17%). In the housewife and semi-housewife categories, wives had a
significantly smaller total work load, whereas in the drudge-wife and two-housekeeper
households the opposite were true.
Myra Marx Ferree (1991) conducts a similar study more than a decade later, but
concentrating on dual-earner couples only. Her results are in line with those of Bergmann: the
total work loads of men and women are on average the same but with a greater variability in
women’s total work load. Over this time-span, equality between the spouses had both
increased (the proportion of couples with ”moderately egalitarian arrangements”) and
decreased as the proportion of drudge-wife household among dual-earners were larger in
Ferree’s study than in Bergmann’s.
Harriet B. Presser (1994) presents somewhat diverging results concerning the
distribution of work of 2000 American dual-earner married couples. Her results indicate that
an employed married American woman does twice as much housework as her husband and
together with her paid work, she works on average five hours more per week.
10 Altogether,
these studies seem to suggest the existence of a hierarchical decision order: many women are
assigned the responsibility for the bulk of the housework first, and then they may choose how
much paid work to engage in. This could of course still be coherent with spouses who agree
on a common utility function and need not reflect conflict in all households.
                                                                                                                                                        
9 See e.g. Lennart Flood and Anders Klevmarken (1990), chapter 10.
10 Another interesting finding in this study is that the less overlapping the couples’ market working hours are, the
larger share of the household work does the husband do, thus lending further support to the hypothesis that many
people understands housework as primarily the responsibility of the wife.12
3 A first best cooperative model
In this section, I explore the introduction of a preference for fairness in the distribution of
household work in the Samuelson version of the unitary marriage model. A couple’s
behaviour is modelled as if the two members maximise a utilitarian welfare function where
both spouses’ utility carry the same weight, subject to a family budget constraint. The
specification of the fairness component in utility is analogous to Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
and conforms to the evidence of a fairness preference cited in the previous section. My model
is inspired by Reuben Gronau (1977) in that the solution to the utility maximisation problem
always involve both spouses in both paid and unpaid work. This is guaranteed by the
assumption of decreasing returns in household production.
11
Unlike Gronau but in common with Konrad and Lommerud (1995), the labour-
leisure choice is assumed to be exogenous so that the two partners are to allocate their total
labour time T  between market and housework. Spouse i spend  Hi  hours on unpaid
household production (”housework”) and  M T H i i = - ( ) hours on paid market work. The
index i f m = , , where  f stands for a female spouse and m denotes her male partner. The
variable wi  is spouse i’s exogenously given labour market wage rate. Throughout the paper, I
assume that the husband’s wage is higher than his wife’s: w w f m < . However, I assume that
both spouses are equally productive in housework. The production function of the household
public good is assumed to be: h h H h H f m = + ~( ) ~( ) where ¶ ¶ ~ h Hi > 0 and ¶ ¶
2 2 0 ~ h Hi <  for
i f m = ,  and ¶ ¶ ¶
2 0 ~ h H H i j =  for i j „ . The decreasing returns to each partner’s time in
housework are thought to be a reasonable assumption for short time periods (because of
tiredness and the often monotonous character of housework). Furthermore, the specification I
                                                
11 In a model with linear or even increasing returns, like that of Becker (1981), the solution is a fully specialised
corner solution.13
have chosen implies that one spouse’s productivity in housework is independent of how much
the other partner does, which cannot  be considered too restrictive when housework is
concerned. I further assume that there is no market substitute for the public good.
The individual utility functions include consumption of a private good, c, and a
household public good, h. The members of the couple are assumed to have identical utility
functions, hence U c h i ( , ) denotes the utility from consumption for spouses i f m = , . Along
with the preference for private and household public consumption, the preference for fairness
in the division of the two kinds of work, modelled as V H H m f ( ) , is added.
12 U and V are
assumed to be continuos and twice differentiable. The derivatives uc, uh and  ¢ V  are assumed
to be positive and ucc, uhh  and  ¢¢ V  are assumed to be negative. Furthermore, V is negative for
all ratios  H H m f  less than one, reflecting that for any division of work involving more
housework for the woman, the couple’s utility is less than if they had not cared about fairness.
I assume that when the ratio of the housework loads is one, the wife/couple is satiated in
”equality” and that V( ) 1 0 =  and  ¢ = V ( ) 1 0. In other words, the wife is not interested in
exploiting her husband in housework. Since this preference is assumed to exist for the person
who has the comparative advantage in housework, a mirror preference on behalf of the
husband would prevail for ratios  H H m f  larger than one. The only distribution of
housework for which neither spouse receives disutility from the housework distribution is
when it is shared equally.
The relative importance of price signals and the fairness preference will prove
vital in determining the couple’s optimal time allocation. I use the parameter b to indicate the
weight of the fairness preference relative to the conventional entries in the couple’s utility
                                                
12 In this model the two spouses agree on the household’s utility function. The inclusion of V along with the two
conventional entries in the family social welfare function implies that the husband either shares his wife’s14
function. As we shall see, the preference for fairness alters the relative prices of the wife’s and
husband’s household time, thereby altering the conditions for economic efficiency compared
to a setting in which neither partner cares about the division of housework. The household
maximises:
[ ] U c h U c h V
H
H
c c w T H w T H m f
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￿ ￿ - + - - - - b l         (3.1)
where the first three terms are the utilities described above and the last expression within
square brackets is the household’s budget constraint saying that the expenditure on
consumption of private goods, for which the price is normalised to one, must equal the
household’s total income. The first order conditions for the maximisation of (3.1) are:
ucf - = l 0 (3.2)
ucm - = l 0 (3.3)






























+ ¢ - = (3.5)
c c w T H w T H f m f f m m + - - - - = ( ) ( ) 0. (3.6)
Let us first look at the allocation that would result if there where no preference
for fairness, i.e. the special case when b = 0. First, because h is a public good the same
amount must be enjoyed by both partners. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) then imply that the two
must also consume the same amount of the private consumption good: c c c f m = = *. Second,
equations (3.4) and (3.5) give the condition for the division of housework as:
                                                                                                                                                        
preference for an equal division of the housework, or at least endorses the preference of his wife. Note also that I














=   (3.7)
which leads to H H f m * * > , and consequently to  M M f m * * < . This is the gains from
specialisation result. The spouse with the comparative advantage in housework, here the wife,
optimally does more of it than her spouse, who has his comparative advantage in market
work. The total amount of household public good that will be provided is
h h H h H f m * ~( *) ~( *) = + . Because we study a fully cooperative solution, the externality
associated with a public good is internalised, i.e. the marginal rate of transformation equals















¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ~ ~ .  (3.8)
3.1 A Preference for Fairness
Let us now turn to the case where b > 0, that is, the wife gets disutility from doing more
housework than her husband. Equations (3.2) and (3.3) remain unchanged, which implies that
both partners still get the same amount of private consumption, even if one of them (or both)
care for the division of housework. Equations (3.4) and (3.5) however, now state that the
market prices must be corrected to arrive at the appropriate shadow prices of housework. This


























which is unambiguously larger than the wage ratio in (3.7), indicating a less specialised
division of both housework and market work. In other words, the fairness consideration has a
cost in terms of not fully utilised comparative advantages.16
To see how the optimal time allocation,H f *,  Hm *,  M f * and  Mm *, and also
the consumption distribution, h*and c*, change when the preference for equal sharing in



























The comparative statics are evaluated at the point when b = 0 and uch = 0. When the
household starts to care about fairness in the distribution of housework, it re-adjusts its
equilibrium allocation and consumption. (3.9 i) indicates that the wife decreases her
housework in this fully cooperative household model. Because of the exogenous leisure
choice, she therefore also increases her paid work  M f *, (3.9 ii). The husband’s optimal time
allocation goes in the opposite direction: he increases his housework and decreases his market
work  Mm *. The effect on the household’s consumption mix of this time re-allocation, is
given by (3.9 iii). Depending on the household production technology, the household either
substitutes more private for household public consumption, or the other way round.
Because the wage gap between men and women has diminished in most Western
countries over the last decades, it is interesting to see how a wife’s wage raise, ceteris paribus,
is expected to affect a household’s time and consumption allocation. (3.7) directly implies that
the relative division of the housework becomes more even. The comparative statics (evaluated











The two unambiguous effect of the wife’s wage raise is that private consumption increases
and the husband increases his housework. The effects on the wife’s housework and the level
of household public good are ambiguous due to conflicting income and substitution effects.
Therefore, falling national averages of women’s housework shares are consistent
with an increased preference for fairness, but also with closing gender wage gaps. The model I
use in this section rests on the assumption that household arrangements are made by two
agreeing spouses. This is of course not always certain. The spouses may disagree over what
components to include in a household welfare function. Specifically, it is possible that the
husband does not agree to consider the fairness argument in the household’s utility function at
all. If the spouses cannot agree on one joint utility function, they may have to bargain over the
allocation or they may end the cooperation altogether, either by getting a divorce or by starting
to behave selfishly within a continuing marriage. The relevance of a wife’s preference for
fairness in the latter option is explored in the next section.
4 A noncooperative Cournot-Nash model
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that it is possible that spouses who fail to reach an
agreement on the division of labour and resources, retreat to noncooperative behaviour within
the marriage instead of getting a divorce. In such a marriage, each spouse maximises her own
utility conditioned on her Nash-conjecture about her spouse’s behaviour. The gains from this
kind of marriage is restricted to the joint consumption of the household public good. The
public good will be underprovided because neither partner takes the other’s utility into
consideration when they decide how much housework to provide. Other noncooperative
marriage models are Jane Leuthold (1968), Peter Kooreman and Arie Kapteyn (1990), and
Konrad and Lommerud (1995).18
It is important to study the properties of a noncooperative marriage for a number
of reasons. First, there are several decisions that people make without negotiating with their
spouse. Education would be one good example, as well as certain other career related choices.
Second, there is substantial evidence that people are willing to give up own utility in order to
punish others who do not behave nicely. Even though both partners could do better by
cooperating they may choose not to, simply to punish one another. Third, Ken Binmore, Ariel
Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky (1986) argue that ”utilities during conflict” are the relevant
threatpoints in cooperative bargaining models. In other words, the solution to the
noncooperative game affects the cooperative bargaining outcome.
Here I will set up a simple static noncooperative model à la Cournot-Nash and
examine the interaction between a preference for equal loads of housework, the distribution of
paid and unpaid work that emerges, and the underprovision of the household public good.
Everything except the decision process is modelled as in the first best model in the previous
section, that is, utility and household production functions, wages rates, and the fairness
preference are the same. The household allocation emerges as each partner maximises their
own utility, where the other partner comes in only as providing some household time which
leads to a contribution to the household public good.
The wife maximises her own utility in choosing her time in household labour,
H f  conditioned on her estimate of her husband’s contribution, Hm
e , where the superscript e
indicates a conjecture. Her private consumption cf  then follows from the budget constraint.
Equation (4.1) gives the wife’s maximisation problem:
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where h h H h H
e
f m
e = + ~( ) ~( ) is the wife’s conjecture of the total amount of household public



















The husband faces a similar maximisation problem but without the fairness preference, so the











Equations (4.2) and (4.3) implicitly give the partners’ reaction functions,
H H f m
e ( ) and H H m f
e ( ), for given T , b, and wage rates. In other words, (4.2) expresses the
wife’s supply of housework for different levels of (her estimate of) the husband’s housework.
The expressions for the slopes of these reaction functions are derived in Appendix 2. The
husband’s reaction function has a negative slope, which means that if his wife for some reason
should increase her housework, the husband’s response would be to contract his own. The
slope of the wife’s reaction function is also negative unless the preference for fairness, b , is
very large. I will restrict the analysis to small enough values of b.
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this noncooperative game is the solution,
denoted H H f
N
m
N , , to the simultaneous equation system (4.2) - (4.3), where the Nash
conjecture assumption H H i
e
i =  for i f m = ,  has been imposed, that is, in equilibrium, the
partners are correct in their conjectures of the other’s housework time.
If the model had had fixed productivities in household production, the Cournot-
Nash solution would imply that the spouse with a comparative advantage in housework
contributes more to the household public good than the other spouse.
13 In my setting, with
                                                
13 For such a model, see Konrad and Lommerud (1995).20
decreasing returns in household production, the equilibrium distribution of housework cannot
be determined without further assumptions. We are interested in an equilibrium where the




N > . It is shown in Appendix 2 that if ¶ ¶ H w i i < 0, for i f m = , , the partner with the
lower wage does more housework in equilibrium (still assuming that uch = 0. This requires
that the spouses’ Arrow-Pratt’s relative risk aversion measure, - c u u i c c c i i i , is larger than one
for i f m = , .
14 Therefore, in the following, I simply have to assume that the Arrow-Pratt
measures are less than one.
4.1 The equilibrium
Let us first briefly look at the features of the equilibrium when b = 0. We assume that the




N >  and  M M f
N
m
N < . Together with the fact that the wife’s wage is lower, this implies
that the wife gets less private consumption than her husband, c c f
N
m
N < . Furthermore, by




















which implies that both housework and market work are more equally divided than in the first
best world, cf. (3.7). In other words, there is some specialisation, but not to the economically
efficient extent.
Because neither spouse take their spouse’s utility of their housework into
account, we know that too little of the household public good is provided: h h
N < *.
                                                
14 Actually, the term risk-aversion is misleading in this context. In this non-stochastic model, the Arrow-Pratt
measure has an interpretation in terms of income and substitution effects rather than actual risk. What I assume21
Furthermore, we know that H H f
N
f < *. So the wife in a noncooperative marriage
unambiguously works more in the market and less in household production than she would
have done in a cooperative marriage (without a fairness preference). It is clear that the two
partners’ equilibrium utility levels may be rather unequal and that the wife gets lower utility.
On the other hand, the larger engagement in the labour market makes the noncooperative wife
financially more independent, i.e. her situation is less risky in case of dissolution of the
marriage.
Let us now return to the case of a fairness preference. If the wife in the
noncooperative model cares about fairness in housework, the equilibrium division of work is

































 The equilibrium effects of an increase in b , evaluated at the point where b = 0 are


















In other words, when the wife increases her preference for fairness in
housework, she reduces her own engagement in it. Both partners then consume less of the
public good, and the husband responds to this by increasing his own time in housework.
Assuming that both private and public consumption are normal goods, he does not
compensate for the total amount withdrawn by the wife, however, so the entire amount of
                                                                                                                                                        
about the Arrow-Pratt measure amount to that the substitution effect dominates the income effect.22
public good available in the noncooperative household decreases as the preference for fairness
increases. These results are qualitatively the same as in the first best model. However, the
effects on private consumption of a change in b go in opposite directions for the two spouses,













Because the woman originally enjoyed less private consumption than her husband, the
increased preference for a fair housework division makes the partners more equal off in terms
of consumption. However, with the fairness preference, the wife also experiences a disutility
from the distribution of housework, bV H H m
N
f
N ( ), and she is still clearly worse off than her
husband.
In the first best model, a rise in the wife’s wage lead her to either increase or
decrease her market work depending on the magnitudes of income and substitution effects.
Here, in the noncooperative model, I have had to assume that the substitution effect dominates
to ensure that the wife does more housework. Under this assumption, the comparative statics


























The husbands reaction to the wife’s wage raise consists of a pure income effect.
When his wife decreases her housework, the husband compensates the loss by increasing his
own. Because both goods are normal, he does not compensate up to the level prior to the wage23
raise, so the effect on the equilibrium household good is negative. From (4.7 i and ii) it also


















Therefore, in contrast to the first best where either spouse’s wage raise leave both partners
better off, a wife’s wage raise in a noncooperative equilibrium leaves the husband
unambiguously worse off. The female wage raise clearly serves to render the partners’ utility
levels more equal. If we see the noncooperative outcome as fallback positions in cooperative
bargaining, we can conclude that in any bargaining marriage, men stand to loose from an
increase in their wife’s wage.
The presence of a fairness preference has been proved to alter time and
consumption allocation both in this model and in the first best model of the previous section.
Furthermore, the fairness preference have different implications in the noncooperative
household model and the first best model. It seems natural to continue by discussing the
empirical relevance of the two models and also how some policies will affect cooperative and
noncooperative households with different degrees of fairness orientation.
5 Some possible implications for policy
In the noncooperative equilibrium, the household public good is underprovided. The
government can improve the allocation by implementing policies that increase the partners’
housework. On the other hand, the first best model of section 3 leaves no room for
government intervention. There is simply no market failure to correct. In practice, however,
governments have political agendas including for example measures to reduce unemployment
and to redistribute consumption possibilities across and within households, whatever the24
households’ allocation processes are. To be able to evaluate different policies, it is important
to acknowledge that households may have different allocation mechanisms. Here, I will
discuss the implications of a few policy measures that have been proposed lately
distinguishing households along two lines: whether the spouses agree or not and whether they
care about fairness or not. At this stage, it is useful to recall the study by Bergmann (1986),
that distinguished between five distinct types of households based on the gendered division of
market, household and total work loads.
An attempt to describe Bergmann’s household categories in terms of the
parameters of my two models is found in Table 5.1. For example, some cooperative couples
may pay no attention to the wage gap but choose to pursue two market careers and share the
housework equally, whatever the labour market opportunities of the spouses. In terms of my
model, this is the situation when b is very large and hence, the wage ratio is irrelevant. In
terms of Bergmann’s study, these households correspond either to the two-housekeeper
households or the cash-paying households.
15 In contrast, the housewife and semi-housewife
households in her study can be thought of as couples who care relatively little for sharing, i.e.
they have a low b. Note that Table 5.1 is only meant to be interpreted suggestively. For
example, my models feature the same amount of leisure for both spouses, which is not true for
housewife, semi-housewife and drudge-wife categories. It is only to present the general idea of
categorising household along the two dimensions described above. My general point is that
policies may affect these household categories differently.
                                                
15 What determines whether a fairness-oriented couple choose the cash-paying or two-housekeeper model?
Empirically, the first category consists of young urban couples without children. In economic terms, this amounts
to that they have less need for h relative to c , and/or that the price of market h relative to home produced h  is
low (proximity to fast-food outlets, restaurants, laundry services etc.).25
Table 5.1. Suggestive description of Bergmann’s (1986) household
categories related to the parameters of my models.
Cooperative noncooperative
household type b w w f m wife’sb w w f m
housewife low <<1 low <<1
semi-housewife low <1 low/high (<)<1
cash-paying/ two-housekeepers high irrelevant not compatible
drudge-wife      not compatible low » 1
Based on results in their optimal taxation study Patricia F. Apps and Ray Rees
(1997) suggest that a system of gender specific tax rates, higher for men and lower for women,
may reduce the overall dead-weight loss of the tax system. The result rests on the stylised fact
that the female labour supply is more wage-elastic than the male labour supply. Within my
framework, this is not true for cooperative sharing-oriented couples. The spouses’ labours
supplies only move together, so they will not respond to a gender relative wage change. For
these households, the policy will then have no tangible effect apart from altering total income.
For remaining couples, the policy will increase the female labour supply and decrease the
male labour supply.
16 However, this has different welfare effects depending on whether the
couple agree or not. Within the cooperative couple, partners share a common consumption
bundle, so they will be affected in the same way. In the noncooperative household, this policy
amounts to redistributing welfare from the husband to the wife and the amount of household
public good will be altered. Furthermore, because a smaller wage gap implies less
specialisation of tasks, wives with a fairness preference will be more satisfied. To summarise,
                                                
16 With certain restrictions on the magnitudes of the cross-effects.26
introducing gender specific tax rates may have substantial distributional side-effects unique to
the different household types.
Another policy measure that has already been employed in a number of
European countries is that of publicly subsidised market substitutes for home produced
household public goods. The primary target of this kind of policy is to reduce unskilled
unemployment, see Peter Birch S￿rensen (1997) for an overview. In Sweden, the ongoing
discussion about this kind of policy also includes a gender equity argument: employed women
will be able to increase their market labour supply when they can buy market substitutes for
their unpaid housework. Suppliers of these services are believed to be primarily unemployed
unskilled women, which will also be a good thing for gender equality. Although my models
do not include market substitutes for h, I think it is fair to say that, again, such a policy will
affect household with different values of b differently. For some couples in the housewife
category, the wife’s wage may be so low that the proposed price change will not alter their
time allocation. On the other hand, some of the cooperative semi-housewife households may
substitute market bought h for some of the home produced h and allocate more of
(primarily) the woman’s time to market work. This will improve gender equality in these
households in the sense that it reduces the financial risk wives are exposed to in case of
divorce of widowhood. As far as the sharing oriented cooperative couples are concerned, they
will experience a positive income effect. Cash-paying couples will be able to buy the service
they demand at a lower price and also the two-housekeeper households may buy more services
and supply more labour to the market. In noncooperative semi-housewife households, it is not
straightforward to predict what the introduction of subsidised household services imply. My
guess is that there will be such households where the husband but not the wife affords to
substitute market services for their own time in housework. The wives in these households
may find themselves worse off in terms of the fairness issue, if they are not prepared to view27
the husband’s purchase as a contribution to housework. This policy will probably be a good
thing for drudge-wives, whose housework load can be reduced. In reality, it is not clear that
she uses the time that has been made available to supply more market work, however.
Another issue discussed in many European countries concerns the effects of a
shorter workday. Such policy measure will probably make some housewife households
transform into semi-housewife households so that these households can maintain a certain
level of private consumption. Within the framework of my model, there will be less
specialisation of tasks for all households where one spouse (usually the husband) voluntarily
works more in the labour market than the legislated maximum prescribes. In my specification
with exogenous leisure, he will have to increase his housework. In reality, however, he may
choose to take more leisure instead, leaving his wife with a larger work load than before the
introduction of the policy. However, it is hard to believe that this would happen in agreeing
households, so again the households’ allocation process matters for policy outcomes. As far as
the fairness oriented couples are concerned, this policy will either affect both spouses to the
same extent or neither spouse, depending on their market labour supply before the policy is
implemented.
6 Conclusion
In this study I argue that preferences concerning fairness of the division of labour between
spouses are likely to influence households’ allocation of paid and unpaid work. Nevertheless,
to my knowledge, this fact has never been modelled in theories of household allocation. I
explore the effects of such a preference for fairness on the equilibrium outcomes in the two
different household allocation models, a model where the couple agree on a common family
utility function and another model where the spouses do not agree and fail to cooperate. The28
results of the fairness preference in the two models partly coincide and partly diverge. As far
as the division of labour is concerned, the effects are the same for both models: the wife
increases her market work and decreases her housework and the husband does the opposite. In
the first best model, this can be thought of as a shift towards sharing bread-winner and home-
maker responsibilities. In the noncooperative setting, the opposite is true: because the
available amount of household public good declines, so does the overall gains from marriage.
Therefore, although divorces are not explicitly modelled in this paper, I think it is reasonable
to argue that if the wife’s preference for equal shares of housework increases, so does the risk
of a divorce for two noncooperative spouses.
The changes in consumption patterns are not the same in the two models. When
the partners agree on a joint welfare function, the wife’s preference for fairness induces a
rearrangement of the shared consumption bundle. Whether this couple gets more private good
and less household public good or the other way round depends on the housework technology.
Apart from the reduction of the public good, the noncooperative marriage entails less private
consumption for the husband and more for the wife. Because we only study a marginal
increase in the fairness preference, the wife is still worse off than her husband as she enjoys
less private consumption and also experiences some negative utility from the unequal shares
of housework.
In the first best model, a female wage raise improves welfare for both partners
whereas in the noncooperative model, it re-distributes welfare from the husband to the wife.
These effects were derived when there was no fairness preference present. By continuity, these
effects also hold when the fairness preference is small.
In section 5, I argued that it is important for policy makers to acknowledge that
households have different allocation processes and also are concerned with fairness to
different degrees. I suggested that these two dimensions influence policy outcomes. Even29
though my modelling of a fairness preference has empirical underpinning, it becomes clear in
the policy discussion that my models of household time allocation have their limits. Empirical
work by Bergmann (1986) and others suggests that household members far from always get
the same amount of leisure. It becomes clear that the so called drudge-wife household
category does not fit very well into the framework I have built here. In future work on
fairness, household allocation and public policy, I hope to cope with this in allowing for
endogenous leisure.
In reality, one can think of a number of reasons why spouses fail to cooperate. It
may be because they disagree about the fairness issue or they may disagree about their utility
weights in a common welfare function. A further possibility (that needs not lead to conflict
however), is that the spouses have different utility functions with respect to the two
consumption goods. In fact, it is often argued that women have a stronger preference for a
clean house, home-cooked dinners, and time with their children. In a sequel to this paper, I
plan to look more into this, as well as to extend future analysis to include market substitutes
for home production.30
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Appendix 1 The comparative statics in the first best model



































( ) ( ) 2 0 c w T H w T H f f m m - - - - = (A1.3)
(A1.1) - (A1.3) are then differentiated with respect to c H H f m , ,  and b. The resulting system
can be written as:
w u A B



















































































































































































A, Band C are positive evaluated at b = 0. Furthermore, to keep computations as simple as
possible, I assume that the cross derivative uch is zero.
17 The system determinant of (A1.4)
equals:
w u A B
w u B C
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. (A1.8)
The sign of (A1.8) depends on the sign of the parenthesis on the right, which in turn depends
on the household production technology. For example, for a technology  ~ h Hi =
a , a <1, the
expression within the parentheses equals zero so that the net effect on private consumption is
zero. Furthermore,
                                                
17 It is sufficient to assume that uch is not too negative, that cand h are not too close substitutes in utility.35














































































= -2 . Therefore, a rise in b induces a re-mix of the household’s
consumption substituting some of the consumption of one good for more of the other good.
Differentiating (A1.1) - (A1.3) with respect to c H H f m , ,  and wf  renders a new
system which can be written as:
w u A B





















































The system determinant of (A1.10) is also  I . Using Cramer’s rule, the comparative statics of
a wife’s wage raise are:
dH
dw
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The wife’s reaction to her own wage raise consists of an income effect and a substitution
effect. These go in opposite direction so (A1.11) cannot be signed. (A1.12) describes the
husband’s reaction to his wife’s wage change and it is strictly positive. As for the private36
consumption, (A1.13) is also positive (using (3.7)). Because (A1.11) cannot be signed, the
effect of a wife’s wage increase on household public consumption is also ambiguous.
Appendix 2 The noncooperative model
(4.2) defines H f  as an implicit function of  Hm
e  and (4.3) likewise defines  Hm as an implicit
function of H f
e . These implicit functions are the two partners’ reaction function, indicating
how a change in the (conjecture of the) spouse’s housework time affect the own housework








































































































































where (A2.2) is unambiguously negative and (A2.1) is negative for b = 0.  b has an
ambiguous effect on (A2.1), so we cannot say what happens to the slope of the wife’s reaction
function when she becomes more aware about equality in the distribution of housework. Like
in the first best model, this restricts the range of possible b:s.
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18 As in the first best section, I have evaluated this slope and the comparative statics for the case where
uch = 0 .37
A2.1 Comparative Statics
Differentiating the simultaneous equation system (4.2) and (4.3) and imposing the Nash
equilibrium condition:  H H i
e


































































































































































J DG EF = = -
which equals:
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It is easily seen that this is positive. The comparative statics of an increased preference for
































































































< , we can further conclude that (A2.5) is a larger adaptation than (A2.6).






















































Unlike in the cooperative model, this is unambiguously negative. Furthermore, because the
wife increases her market work and the husband decreases his, the effects on private
consumption of a change in b go in the opposite directions so that the woman gets more
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Like in the first best model, the wife’s own wage effect consists of conflicting income and
substitution effects. Unlike the first best, it is also obvious that the spouses’ reactions go in
opposite directions (because  F  and G  are positive). It is here that the Arrow-Pratt’s relative








than one, the own wage effect is negative, i.e. when the wife gets a raise, she reduces her time
spent in housework, whereas her husband compensates this by increasing his housework. If
the same is true for the husband’s utility, the equilibrium must involve that the person with the
lower wage does the more housework. Therefore, in my application here, I have to assume
that Arrow-Pratt’s measure is larger than one to ensure that H H f
N
m
N >  when b = 0. Again,
we can conclude that the wife’s reaction is larger than her husband’s. Therefore, the total
effect of the spouses’ reactions on the total amount of household public good carries the same






















































Therefore, given the assumption about the Arrow-Pratt measures, a wife’s wage raise leaves






> 0 (ii) 
dc
dw
m
f
< 0. (A2.12)